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HEART ATTACK CASES UNDER THE WASHINGTON
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
FLOYD L. NEWLAND
The recent case of Windust v. Department of Labor and Industries'
brought an important change in Washington workmen's compensation
law with the overruling of a long-standing rule relating to recovery
under workmen's compensation for heart failure. The Windust case
apparently means there can be recovery for heart failure resulting
from strain only when the strain is "unusual." It appears that if the
worker is doing only a routine act there can be no recovery. Though
the new rule is not definitively articulated at this point, this inquiry
will attempt to assess what the Washington Supreme Court has done
and indicate what it will do in the future.
The workmen's compensation act, as first enacted in 1911, allowed
recovery for an injury which was the result of a "fortuitous event."
Interpreting the original statute in Frandila v. Department of Labor
and Industries,' the court allowed recovery for the death of a work-
man who suffered a fatal heart attack while chopping the roots of a
tree at the bottom of a ditch. The court held that death in that in-
stance was caused by a "fortuitous event" and said:
Where a workman, not in perfect health, during the course of his
employment makes an extra exertion which, in addition to his infirmity,
causes an injury, such injury is a fortuitous event, and brings him
within the operation of the compensation.'
The legislature quickly enacted a new definition of the word "in-
jury," embodied in the present statute, which reads:
"Injury." "Injury" means a sudden and tangible happening, of a
traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and occur-
ring from without; an occupational disease; and such physical condition
as results from either. RCW 51.08.100 [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.),
7675; Rem. Supp. 1941, 7679-1].
The leading case construing this definition of "injury" has been
McCormick Lumber Co. v. Department of Labor and Industries.' In
1152 Wash. Dec. 1, 323 P.2d 241 (1958).
2 The statutory definition of injury was ". . . only to an injury resulting from some
fortuitous event as distinguished from the contraction of disease." Rem. Rev. Stat. §
7675, L. 1941, c. 74 § 3, p. 346.
3137 Wash. 530, 243 Pac. 5 (1926).
4 Id. at 537.
5 7 Wn.2d 40, 108 P.2d 807 (1941).
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that case the court examined each of its prior decisions and stated the
following as a rule of law: "An accident arises out of the employment
when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for
the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the
condition of the workman's health."8 After discussing its prior cases,
the court refused to require a showing that the workman was under
an unusual strain. The court thought that to require such a showing
would be to "introduce an element of uncertainty and confusion .... ",
It is to be noticed that RCW 51.08.100 is a definition of "injury,"
and the McCormick case is worded in terms of an accident arising
out of employment. The court in the McCormick case was, however,
considering the statutory definition of "injury." By the wording "a
sudden and tangible happening, of a traumatic nature producing an
immediate or prompt result and occurring from without," the statute
requires what would normally be thought of as an event. These words
shall be considered as referring to, and requiring, a particular event
when used in this article. The other words in the statute, "an occu-
pational disease; and such physical condition as results from either,"
refer to a condition which would normally be thought of as an injury.
It seems, therefore, that the statute contains within its definition of
"injury" both an event and an injury. The two in combination make
what would be normally considered an accident, and it is submitted
that this is what prompted the court to refer to an accident in the
McCormick case. In the McCormick case the court was considering
what the nature of the event must be. The McCormick case was not
concerned with what causal connection there must be between the
event and the resulting condition of the worker-in these cases, heart
failure. In no sense should the McCormick case be read as doing
away with the need of showing that the event did in fact cause the
heart failure.
The court indicated that the Department of Labor and Industries
was contending that a strain-caused heart attack was not "traumatic"
unless it was caused by some violent, strenuous, or unusual exertion.8
The court did not expressly answer this contention, but it did decide
that usual activity is an event which meets the requirements of RCW
51.08.100. This was done without an exhaustive analysis of the word-
ing of the statute, but rather was based on prior decisions, which were





discussed extensively. In this way the department's contention relating
to the word "traumatic" was recognized and then refused. In this case
it was the usual activity, and not the subsequent heart failure, which
was the event required by the statute.
In the McCormick case, the court did not rule as a matter of law
that there was causation between the event and the heart failure. AU
the court did was to accept the finding of fact that death was caused
by exertion which was usual for that workman. The court said this
about the facts as reported to it: "[T]he joint board, after a review
of the testimony, made a finding that Sellin's death was attributable
to the exertion undertaken at the time of his injury and concluded that
the death was compensable under the statute."9
The court was very specific in requiring a causal connection between
the event required by RCW 51.08.100 and the heart failure in the
recent case of Mork v. Department of Labor and Industries." Every
time a worker does an act, there has been an event which very well
might qualify as a happening of a traumatic nature, as defined by the
statute and interpreted by the McCormick case; but that is not a
sufficient basis upon which to ground a recovery. There must also be
a causal connection, and the proof of cause must be substantial. In
the Mork case the cause was alleged to be Mork's climb up a long ramp
to his place of work. There was medical testimony to the effect that,
if he had not climbed to his place of employment, he would have lived
at least another minute. This was found not to be sufficient causation
upon which to ground a claim under the workman's compensation
statute. The court said:
Death, which is the last stage of a progressive disease, is not within
the scope of the industrial insurance act. To be within the act, an indus-
trial injury must have a causal relation to the death of the workman,
who otherwise would have lived for an indefinite and unpredictable
time. Mere acceleration of the final stage of a disease is not proof of the
required causal relationship. (Emphasis added.)"
The concept of causation includes the question of whether the event
was of such a character that it should be given legal significance. This
problem was faced in the Mork case, where the court thought that
hastening death by one minute was not legally significant. If we accept
the premise that death was hastened by one minute, then in some
9 Id. at 45.
10 48 Wn.2d 74, 291 P.2d 650 (1955).
rl Id. at 77.
[WINTER
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degree there was causation between the act of climbing to the place of
work and death. The court said:
The burden was upon respondent to prove that the deceased's climb
to his station was an industrial injury in the sense that it was a con-
tributing cause of his death, without which he would not have died
when he did. Petersen v. Department of Labor and Industries, 40
Wn. (2d) 635, 245 P. (2d) 1161. The theory that an acceleration of
death by one minute meets this requirement, is unsound. (Emphasis
added.)1 2
This would seem to limit the rule of the McCormick case, which
would allow recovery no matter what the condition of the workman's
heart. In fact, however, the McCormick case has to do only with the
degree of exertion needed to have an "event," while the Mork case
has to do with the element of causation. The two cases do not meet
on the same issue. Even though the Mork case may seem to indicate
a change in attitude, 3 it did not change the McCormick rule. 4
The court held in Cyr v. Department of Labor and Industries5 that
the causal connection between an event which qualifies as a "sudden
and tangible happening" and a fatal heart attack must be proved by
medical testimony. In that case a hypothetical question to a physician,
who was testifying as an expert witness, assumed the workman was
exerting effort when there was no evidence of exertion and assumed
a pre-existing heart condition which was not proved. As the hypo-
thetical question did not coincide with the proof, the expert medical
testimony was of no value and left the plaintiff without any medical
testimony. This justified the trial court in taking the case from the
jury and directing a verdict for the Department of Labor and In-
dustries.
While there is a requirement of proof of causal relation between
the event and the heart attack, the court consistently has held this
12 Id. at 76-77. This language explains what was meant by the court in Petersen v.
Department of Labor and Industries, 40 Wn.2d 635, 640, 245 P.2d 1161 (1952) where
the court said, "We have never dispensed with a minimum showing that the employ-
ment or an accident occurring during employment must have been, more likely than
not, a contributing factor to the death, without which the death would not have
occurred when it did." (Emphasis added.)
13 Casenote, Causation in Heart Cases, 31 WAsH. L. REv. 192, 194.
14 Petersen v. Department of Labor and Industries, 40 Wn.2d 635, 245 P.2d 1161(1952) is another case which shows the definite need to prove causation. In this case
the court pointed out that the tangible happening requirement, recognized as needed
in the McCormick case, was met, but there was no showing of causation between the
act of rolling a heavy barrel and death.
15 47 XVn.2d 92, 286 P.2d 1038 (1955) ; accord, Dayton v. Department of Labor and
Industries, 45 Wn.2d 797, 278 P2d 319 (1954).
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requirement is met by a showing that the strain was more likely than
not the cause of death. This was the holding in Barnett v. Department
of Labor and Industries,16 handed down since the Windust case over-
ruled McCormick. The court said:
The rule is that it must appear from medical testimony that the inci-
dent relied upon was more likely than not the cause of the injury
claimed. Stampas v. Department of Labor and Industries, 38 XWn.
(2d) 48, 227 P. (2d) 739). . . . The doctor's testimony on cross-
examination only meant that the cause was not certain, and that there
was the possibility that the incident was not a proximate cause of the
coronary thrombosis.
This degree of uncertainty and speculation occurs in many medical
diagnoses. It is consistent for a doctor to admit an element of specula-
tion, and still be convinced that an incident is more likely than not the
cause of the injury.17
It is to be noted that the court in this case mentions "proximate
cause," which includes the idea that the event alleged to have caused
the heart attack must be of enough importance to be given legal
significance.
Haerling v. Department of Labor and Industries"8 requires that a
"sudden and tangible happening" be of such a character that it can
be isolated at one particular point in time. A "happening" is required
by the statute, and this would seem to indicate a particular affair
isolated in time as opposed to a transaction or a state of flux. The
court described the requirement in this way:
The cumulative effect of long continued routine and customary duties
upon a workman, regardless of the hours devoted thereto, is not a
sudden and tangible happening. The statute contemplates a happening
of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate and prompt result.. ... 9
Thus the Haerling case demonstrates that the rule of the McCormick
case could be used only when there was a specific event which caused
the heart attack, and could not be used if the cumulative effect of
working on a particular job caused the heart failure. The Haerling
case is not inconsistent with the McCormick case but only points out
the need to have a particular isolated event.
The Haerling case may seem inconsistent with McCormick, inas-
much as McCormick would allow recovery no matter what the con-
16 152 Wash. Dec. 378, 325 P.2d 896 (1958).
17 Id. at 380.
Is 49 Wn.2d 403, 301 P.2d 1078 (1956).
19 Id. at 405.
[WINTF
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dition of the workman's heart. Thus it could be argued his heart was
very weak and could not withstand usual strain. That is to say, this
was the last event in a series which weakened his heart and, in the
final analysis, caused the death. The Haerling case did not present
this situation, since the plaintiff contended that death was the result
of the long, strenuous overtime work which had been done over an
extended period of time. Therefore the pre-Windust rule of law as to
strain-caused heart attacks could be stated thus: There had to be an
event which more likely than not caused a strain which was too
great for the workman in question, regardless of the degree of
exertion or the condition of his heart.
Into this situation Windust v. Department of Labor and Industries
intruded.20 The divided court2 ' overruled the McCormick case. The
point at which the court struck was the rule allowing recovery when-
ever the exertion was too great for the particular worker, regardless
of his physical condition. This rule, which was the law in Washington
since even before the McCormick case, has been replaced by a rule,
the dimensions of which are not yet known.
In deciding to overrule the McCormick case, the court, although it
professed not to rely on stare decisis, did rely on the Mork case, which
was decided on causation reasoning. The majority seemed interested
in the definition of "sudden and tangible happening," however, as it
italicized those words when quoting the statutory definition of injury.-
The court also relied on the Haerling case in its attempt to determine
what the legislature meant by "injury." The inquiry in the Haerling
case, however, was as to what constitutes an event, and in the Windust
case (as in the McCormick case), the point of concern appears to be
20152 Wash. Dec. 1, 301 P.2d 1078 (1958).
21 Chief Justice Hill and Judges Donworth, Weaver, and Ott signed the majority
opinion written by Judge Mallory. Judges Donworth and Ott concurred in overruling
the McCormick case but with reservations about what was said as to the applicability
of the doctrine of stare decisis. Judge Foster's dissent was concurred in by Judge
Rosellini. Judge Rosellini also concurred in the dissenting opinion written by Judge
Finley. Judge Hunter did not participate.
2 The court also overruled all the cases following the McCormick case, and in so
doing specifically overruled: Summerlin v. Department of Labor and Industries, 8
Wn.2d 43, 111 P.2d 603 (1941) ; Cooper v. Department of Labor and Industries, 11
Wn.2d 248, 118 P.2d 942 (1941) ; Northwest Metal Products Inc. v. Department of
Labor and Industries, 12 Wn.2d 155, 120 P.2d 855 (1942) ; Guy F. Atkdnson Co. v.
Webber, 15 Wn.2d 579, 131 P.2d 421 (1942) ; Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of
Labor and Industries, 34 Wn.2d 498, 208 P.2d 1181 (1949) ; Fleischman v. Department
of Labor and Industries, 34 Wn.2d 631, 209 P.2d 363 (1949) ; Merritt v. Department
of Labor and Industries, 41 Wn.2d 633, 251 P.2d 158 (1952).
2 See Metcalf v. Department of Labor and Industries, 168 Wash. 305, 11 P.2d 821
(1932).
24 152 Wash. Dec. 1, 5, 323 P.2d 241 (1958).
1958]
VASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
how violent or unusual the event must be. This is not to be confused
with the Mork case (in which the event was climbing the ramp to the
place of employment), where the court concluded that the event did
not have enough effect on the worker to be considered in law as the
cause of his death, since it only hastened his death by one minute.
The best way to illustrate the difference between the Haerling case
and the Windust case is by a comparison of their facts. In Haerling
that which was alleged to have been a "sudden and tangible happen-
ing" was the long, hard work which eventually was too much for the
worker's heart. In the Windust case, the decedent was a driver of a
ready-mix concrete truck who, during the course of his duties, was
required to look into the drum of the truck to determine how much
concrete remained. To do so, he had to walk along a catwalk and
step up about two feet, and while so stepping up he had a heart failure.
Since stepping up to look into the drum of the truck was one specific
incident which could be isolated in time, the case is clearly different
from the Haerling case.
The court could have attempted to decide the case along the line of
the Mork case; that is, to ask whether the event was causally related
to the death. However, the court chose to decide whether the act of
stepping up to look into the drum of the concrete truck was a "hap-
pening" of the character required by RCW 51.08.100. The court said:
Dr. Sloan's testimony followed the customary pattern that, if the
workman had not engaged in his work but had been receiving proper
medical treatment at the time he looked into the drum, he would not
have died.
This satisfied the rule of McCormick Lbr. Co. v. Department of
Labor and Industries, 7 Wn. (2d) 40, 108 P. (2d) 807...25
In overruling the McCormick case, the court gave very little insight
into what would, in the future, be considered a "sudden and tangible
happening." It said: "We are constrained to hold that the routine
act of ten years' standing is not an injury as a matter of law. -"26 The
word "injury" in that context refers to the statutory definition of that
word.
Since the Windust case, the same problem has been faced twice by
the court. In Kruse v. Department of Labor and Industries,= the
court refused recovery for the death of a workman who died while
2 5 1d. at 2.
261d. at 5.
27 152 Wash. Dec. 391, 326 P.2d 58 (1958).
[WIMR
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performing his normal duties. The court emphasized the words "sud-
den and tangible happening, of a traumatic nature," 8 then went on
to say:
The exertion required in the normal routine duties of a job is not,
in itself, an injury within the purview of the statute. There must be
some unusual strain placed upon the workman by the work he is called
upon to perform which is the cause of his injury or death before com-
pensation can be awarded. (Emphasis added.) 29
Similarly, in Hodgkinson v. Department of Labor and Industries"0
recovery was refused for death from heart failure occurring while an
employee was performing his regular duties.
In the Windust, Kruse, and Hodgkinson cases, the court makes it
appear that there is now a rule of law that before a workman can
recover under the workmen's compensation statute, he must show
that the cause of his injury was some unusual strain. The court at
no point in any of the discussions declares which particular words in
RCW 51.08.100 make an unusual strain an essential element of an
"injury." It would seem that the words in the statute most likely to
require this result are "of a traumatic nature." That this should be
so is indicated by Petersen v. Department of Labor and Industries,3
where the court was considering a case in which the claim was based
on a death resulting from rolling a heavy barrel up a ramp. The court
said:
The "traumatic nature" of the "tangible happening" (barrel rolling),
in this case, is not readily apparent. However, our decisions, under
the doctrine of stare decisis, unmistakably dispense with the showing
of an external physical violence.12
In the Petersen case, the court was unconvinced, it appears, that "trau-
matic" implied no external violence.
The words "of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or
prompt result, and occurring from without," when read in the con-
text of the legislature's enactment of a new definition of "injury"
immediately following the Frandila case, could be read to require an
external force applied to the body of the workman. If the court is to
adopt that understanding of the statue, it would appear that not even
unusual strain would be an injury under the statute. However, the
2 1 Id. at 393.
29 Ibid.
30 152 Wash. Dec. 437, 326 P.2d 1008 (1958).
3140 Wn.2d 635, 245 P.2d 1161 (1952).
' 1'd. at 638.
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court said in very deliberate dictum in the Kruse case that an unusual
strain would be a sufficient showing under RCW 51.08.10021
Because the Windust case involves only usual strain, it overrules
only the Washington law concerning usual strain. This means Porter
v. Department of Labor and Industries," giving relief to a one hun-
dred twenty-nine-pound man who was given work requiring him to
carry chokers weighing between seventy-five and eighty pounds across
rugged terrain, when his normal duties were as a log marker and
brander, has not been overruled. The Porter case is clearly a case in-
volving unusual exertion. However, that case loses a great deal of its
authority when it is realized that, at the time the case was decided,
the McCormick case was still the law. The McCormick case, allow-
ing, as it did, recovery for damage done as a result of usual effort,
made a situation where the court had no need to decide whether
recovery should be given if there is unusual strain, as this is well
within the rule of the McCormick case. However, in the Porter case
Chief Justice Hill concurred specially to point out that the opinion
was delayed nine months because of "disagreements within the court.
These disagreements have been happily resolved and all are agreed,
at least as to the result of the opinion."' 5 This statement makes pos-
sible the inference that the court was at that time reconsidering the
McCormick case. This would lead one to surmise that unusual exer-
tion, the key fact of the Porter case, will be the point where the court
will allow recovery. This prospect is enhanced by the narrow margin
by which the McCormick case was overruled.
The "unusual exertion" problem is not peculiar to Washington.
Many courts have had to decide whether their statute would allow
recovery for heart attacks. The various state courts began to differ-
entiate between "usual" and "unusual" strain because of the interpre-
tation they had placed on the word "accident" as it was found in
their particular statutes. In most states the statutes required that
the workman suffer an accident as a prerequisite to recovery of work-
men's compensation. There has long been a conflict in the cases over
whether there can be an accident when a man doing an intentional
act is injured. Some cases hold there is no accident, because the
worker did what he expected to do, and only the result was unex-
pected. These courts would require the means causing the injury to
be unexpected or accidental, whereas in other states it is held that
33 152 Wash. Dec. 391, 393, 326 P.2d 58 (1958).
34 51 Wn.2d 634, 320 P.2d 1099 (1958).
35 Id. at 639.
[WINTR
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an unusual result from an intentional act is an accident.3" Larson says,
"The number one issue here, in theoretical terms, is whether a court
in construing 'accident' will require an accidental cause or will be
satisfied with an accidental result." "7
When the courts of the various states find themselves in a position
where they must determine if there is an accident when the worker
was injured because of strain or exertion, they employ the definition
of "accident" they already have formed. Hence, if the court in a
given state requires an unexpected cause, then usual strain will not
meet the requirement. If, however, the court will allow recovery for
an unexpected result, then usual strain is all that is required for a
recovery, provided, of course, there is the necessary causation.
Even though the Washington workmen's compensation statute does
not use the word "accident," the same problem must be faced. The
Washington statute, being framed with the word "injury," still leaves
open the problem of whether an unexpected result of a usual or ordi-
nary act is compensable, as the phrase "sudden and tangible happen-
ing, of a traumatic nature" is not specific in this matter. It appears
that, through the interpretation of these words in the Windust case,
the court decided there must be an unusual strain before compensation
can be granted in the heart cases, and thereby the Washington court
lined up with the minority position.
This requirement of unusual strain can lead to some hard fact ques.
tions. In Margolies v. Crawford Clothes,"8 New Jersey held that a
salesman who was to move several hundred overcoats from one part
of the store to another, was exerting unusual strain, even though the
clothes were moved four times a year. Even when a truck driver un-
loaded a large amount of cement, bricks, and sheetrock on a hot day,
the resulting heart failure was compensable under the New Jersey
statute."9 In granting recovery the court said, "So in the instant case
the heat, the extraordinary volume of materials delivered and their
heavy weights combined to create unusual exertion... )40
However, a carpenter standing on a scaffold five feet off the ground,
who had to reach just above his head to cut two-by-four beams was
not making an unusual exertion," under the same New Jersey statute.
30 1 LARs N, WORKMEN'S CO MPESATION, 518-26 (1952).
37 Id. at 518.
3824 N.J.Super, 598, 95 A.2d 413 (1953).
39 Molesld v. Bohen, 1 N.J.Super. 136, 62 A.2d 745 (1948).
40 Id. at 745.
41 Gaudette v. Miller, 1 N.J.Super. 145, 62 A.2d 749 (1948).
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And a New Jersey workman, whose normal duty was to remove a
metal crucible weighing approximately one hundred thirty pounds
from a heating unit with the aid of a pulley, was using unusual exer-
tion when he worked unloading forty-pound ingots by hand from a
freight car. In this case, the workman had been required to load ingots
once or twice a month or sometimes every six weeks, always during
overtime." It may be that it was hard fact questions such as these
which led the New Jersey court recently to overrule its prior cases
requiring unusual exertion 4
The Washington court, having stated as a matter of law that there
must be some unusual exertion before a workman can recover for
a heart attack resulting from on-the-job exertion, will invite a great
amount of litigation over what is "unusual." There are several other
states which require a claimant under their workmen's compensation
acts to show some unusual strain as a prerequisite to recovery, though
this is a minority rule." Larson believes the distinction between usual
or unusual is not a valid distinction, in that the criterion assumes
there is a particular amount of exertion necessary or usual for a par-
ticular job. It is Larson's view that one cannot, at the beginning of
employment, know what amount of exertion is going to be needed for
the job undertaken.5
In the Windust case the court decided that a routine act is not the
kind of event required by RCW 51.08.100; it did not decide the ques-
tion of causation. Had the court discussed the problem of causation,
it still might have overruled the McCormick case if it had believed
certain medical authorities who say that usual strain cannot, from a
medical standpoint, be considered the cause of a heart attack.
These medical authorities would not deny that, the greater the exer-
tion one makes, the greater the demand will be on the heart.4 It is
contended, however, that the heart will adapt itself to the individual's
usual exertion. The worker is warned of his condition and "usually
protects himself against exertion greater than maximal because he
experiences shortness of breath or other discomforts."47 Therefore,
42 Franklin v. U.S. Bronze Powder Works, 6 N.J.Super. 320, 71 A.2d 226 (1950).
43 Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 141 A.2d 761 (1958).
1 LARSONT, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION, 519-30 (1952) lists cases from each jurisdic-
tion illustrating whether usual or unusual exertion was required, and what is considered
usual and unusual in each jurisdiction.
4 1 LARsoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, 519-26 (1952).
45 Id. at 546.
46 Viko, Medical Legal Problems of the Heart in Relation to Injury, 23 UTAH B.




it is contended that, in making a determination of what is unusual
exertion or strain, all of the activities of the worker should be con-
sidered." A committee of the Washington State Heart Association,
organized to study what effect exertion has on an injured heart, is of
the opinion that all the activities of the worker on the job and off
should be considered in attempting to determine if, as a matter of
medical fact, the activity in question was the cause of the heart
failure."
The medical authorities are in general agreement that exertion
cannot, except in very rare instances, injure a healthy heart.5 It would
therefore seem wise to have a presumption against causation, even by
unusual effort, when the claimant has had no prior heart damage. This
is not to say that this presumption should apply merely because the
prior heart condition has gone undetected until the injury.
Coronary occlusion due to coronary thrombosis is thought by many
to be the natural result of coronary arteriosclerosis. In some cases
there is a hemorrhage which causes the clot, and this may or may
not be the result of strain. Dr. L. E. Viko, of the University of Utah
Medical School states:
In most instances coronary occlusion occurs when the disease has
narrowed the artery to a point that the fatty degeneration or calcium
deposit erodes the surface of the endothelium [inner lining of artery]
permitting the formation of a blood clot to plug the lumen. Under such
a mechanism the occlusion may be considered the natural course of the
disease and little related to exertion or emotion. Professor Gunn states
that in some uncertain percentage of cases, the occlusion is caused by
hemorrhage into the vessel wall. It is in such mechanism that exertion
,might reasonably be a causal factor. (Emphasis added.)51
Dr. Meyer Texon, of New York City, in summarizing the work of
Dr. Arthur M. Master, states it is Master's position that "nothing
has been demonstrated to indicate a causal relationship between effort
and thrombosis or intimal hemorrhage." 52 He quotes Master as say-
ing, "Nothing you can do can accelerate the actual occlusion and
nothing you can do thus far can prevent the actual occlusion." "3 And
-' Ibid.
' Aronson, Effects of Effort on the Diseased Heart, 55 NORTHWEST MED. 54 (1956).
r Viio, op. cit. supra note 47 at 51. Accord, Phipps, The Effect of UVork on the
Diseased Heart, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bull. No. 2, 175 (1934) (A study of cross-coun-
try runners.)
r1 Viko, op. cit. supra, note 47 at 53.




Dr. Samuel Aronson, of the Washington State Heart Association's
Subcommittee on Trauma and Strain, states:
Coronary artery occlusion by a thrombus or an atheromatous plaque,
with or without intimal hemorrhage, is one of the end stages of coro-
nary atherosclerosis. Coronary atherosclerosis, in turn, is a slowly
progressive pathologic disease entity whose development is not depend-
ent upon exertion, injury or emotional strain. 4
These authorities differ only in that some think strain cannot cause
intimal hemorrhage or thrombosis, regardless of the degree of strain,
while others feel the condition may be caused or aggravated by
unusual strain. Dr. Viko is of the opinion that "coronary thrombosis
with myocardial infarction" does not occur from exertion or emotion
or anoxia except where there is preceding arteriosclerosis." 11 Then
he goes on to say that only exertion which is unusual for the par-
ticular individual can be considered the cause of coronary thrombosis
with myocardial infarction." Even then he would consider it causa-
tive only if the symptoms occur in less than twelve hours following
the unusual strain. 8 Dr. Texon, in summarizing the work of Strong,
states that it was Dr. Strong's opinion that effort may cause myocar-
dial infarction only when relatively excessive for the individual.59
Dr. Ernest P. Boas, of Columbia Medical School, seems to be in
disagreement as to the conclusions expressed above." Whether his
opinion would be different from another authority in a particular
case is not known, but it may be that he too is considering unusual
strain as the causal requisite, as he is not explicit.
Another form of heart attack, coronary insufficiency, is present
when the demand for oxygen by the heart cannot be met by the
quantity of blood which is supplied.6 This can be brought on by
exertion in a normal heart, but is more generally found in a heart
already damaged.2
The committee of the Washington Heart Association which studied
54 Aronson, op. cit. supra, note 49.
55 Viko, op. cit. supra, note 47, at 54 defines myocardial infarction as "the series of
changes taking place in the structures of the heart wall, first of damage, later of repair,
and ultimately leading to a scar in which cases that do end fatally before the fully
sequence of pathologic changes occurs. Particularly in the case of death, coronary
thrombosis may occur without myocardial infarction.
6 Id. at 55.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Texon, op. cit. supra, note 54, at 290.60 Boas, Trauma and Heart Disease, 2 NACCA LAw JOuRNAL 113.




the problem of strain-caused heart failure produced a general guide
for medical witnesses. It was the opinion of this committee that usual
strain should not be considered the cause of the following kinds of
heart failure: death from acute coronary disease, coronary occlusion
with myocardial infarction, acute coronary insufficiency, and acute
pulmonary edema.'
This showing of some current medical opinion is offered only to
show that a substantial group of specialists agree that usual strain
should not be considered the cause of heart attack. The holding in
the Windust case that there must be, as a matter of law, unusual effort
on which to base a claim for heart failure does not appear to be out
of line with current medical opinion. However, as this is a matter
which may be subject to further refinement in the future, it would
seem preferable to put it in the form of a rebuttable presumption.
The result of the Windust case, being a decision of law, may have
a valuable social result. In the past it has been very difficult for a
person with a weakened heart to find employment. Dr. Donal R.
Sparkman, chairman of the Committee on Cardiac Rehabilitation,
Washington State Board Association, described both the need for
employing such persons and the difficulty of finding jobs for them
when he said:
It is our experience that a substantial number of patients may per-
form useful occupations without harm to themselves, and that in many
cases, the emotional frustration resulting from non-employment is
more harmful to the patient than is properly directed occupational
effort....
While our clinic has been operating since January, 1954, it has met
with only moderate success in placing its patients suffering from cardio-
vascular disorders. The reason usually assigned for such resistance is
fear of increased industrial costs under the Washington Worlnen's
Compensation act.64
The fear of expense seems well-founded, as is exemplified by the fact
that in 1956 the cost to an employer for the death of one workman
was well in excess of ten thousand dollars. 65
The Windust case, holding that usual effort is not a basis for recov-
ery for workmen's compensation, should remove this fear of employers
in hiring a worker who has a history of heart disease. It may be that
O3 Aronson op. cit. supra, note 50.
63 Letter from Donal R. Sparkman to L. H. Bates, June 28, 1955.
05 Rutledge, Proposed Procedure for Administering Heart Cases Under the Wash-
ington Industrial Insurance Act, 31 WASH. L. REv. 67 (1956).
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such a legal decision is needed to dispel employers' fear of loss due
to the death or disability of such persons.
SUMMARY
1. Under the McCormick case there could be recovery for strain-
caused heart failure, regardless of the amount of exertion or the con-
dition of the worker's heart.
2. Under the Windust case no recovery will be granted for a heart
failure caused by usual effort.
a. What constitutes unusual exertion is normally considered a
fact question.
b. There is no current holding which definitely decides whether
a heart failure resulting from unusual exertion is a satisfactory
basis for recovery.
3. There is creditable medical opinion that usual strain cannot, from
a medical standpoint, be considered the cause of heart failure. In this
context, usual strain must be considered as encompassing all the activi-
ties of the individual.
4. The result of the Windust case may aid workmen who have had
heart disease, and who again are able to work, find employment.
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